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]OE BRINCAT 
MosT preliminary agreements of sale of immovables contain a 
clause which makes provision for the case in which either party 
resiles from the obli gation. It is necessary that the juridical nature 
and effects of such clauses should be examined. as they have al­
ready caused conflicts in interpretation. The Civil Code deals with 
earnest and with penalty clauses, but does not cover deposits cur­
rently paid on such agreements. 
EARNEST 
The Maltese Civil Code considers earnest in relation to pro­
mises of sale. Section 1409 states that where in any promise to 
sell, earnest has been given, each of the parties shall be at liberty 
to recede from the contract, the party giving the earnest forfeiting 
such earnest, and the party receiving the earnest returning double 
the amount thereof, saving any other usage in regard to the particu• 
lar contract in respect of which eamest has been given. 
In the opinion of J aines Mackintosh t chis institute owes its ori­
gin to the Phoenicians, a commercial and maritime nation, whose 
subjects dispersed and settled over the whole Mediterranean basin, 
carrying with them this custom, and accidentally the name, to 
Greece and Italy. As a confirmation of the conclusion of a bargain, 
a sum of money or a valuable thing was given by one of the par­
ties. generally the buyer, and as we read in the Digest. this often 
took the form ,of a ring. l Gaius says, 1 Quod saepe arrae nomine pre•
emptione datur, non eo pertinet, quasi sine arra convencio nihil 
proficiat, sed ut evidentius probari po ssi t convenisse de precio.' 
The texts emphasise that the giving of earnest was meant to prove 
the conclusion of the contract in a more tangible manner, not that 
this was required for the completion of the agreement. 
During the classical period, earnest was a common accompani• 
ment of the con·tract, and the idea of forfeiting the •arra' to be re-
*This paper is taken from the LL.D. thesis presented by the writer.
l Mackintosh - The Roman Law of Sale, p. 68.
lDigest 14.3.5, 15.
leased from the obligations was still unknown. It was also distinct 
from part-payment of the price, when the execution of the contract 
was postponed, although if money was given as earnest, it could 
be imputed to the price. 3 The buyer forfeited it to the seller if he 
availed himself of the 'lex cornmissoria'. This type of earnest called 
'arra confirmatoria' was the only form recognised in the Pand ects. 
Justinian, while le�ving the practice of ·'arra confirmatoria' un• 
touched, created another form in later legislation. In the Codex4 we 
read: 'lllud etiam adicientes, ut et in posterum, si quae arrae super 
facienda emptione cuiuscumque rei datae sunt sive in scriptis sive 
sine scriptis. licet non sit -specialiter adiectum, quid super isdem 
arris non procedente contractu fieri oporteat, tamen et qui vendere 
pollicitus est venditionem recusans in duplum eas reddere cogatur, 
et qui emere pactus est, ab emptione recedens datis a se arris 
cadat, repetitione earum deneganda.' Two views prevail regarding 
the interpretation of this passage. One opinion holds that this pas• 
sage contemplates a sale in the making, and therefore the earnest 
referred to is the same as given in promises of sale under modern 
codes, the forfeiture of which gives the right to resile from the 
contract, The other opinion, referring to the passage of the lnsti· 
cutes quoted in Ch apter One which reproduces with some variations 
the extract from the Codex, holds that the earnest refers to com­
pleted sales and that the forfeiture of the arra was meant to limit 
the damages for non-fulfilment of the obligation to that amount, or 
that this was an additional penalty on that 'lltnich was due by way 
of damages. 
Professor Jolowicz5 states, 'In the classical law arra served 
purely evidentiary purposes; but as .•• in Greek law, where the 
rule of consensual sale is not so fully developed as at Rome, its 
object was the much more important one of serving as a forfeit in 
case the giver (normally the buyer) failed to fulfil his contract, 
while the recipient, if he failed, had to restore the arra and as 
much again. The arra could thus be said to have a 'penitential' 
function i.e. either party could withdraw from the bargain, provided 
he was willing to lose the amount of arra. This penitential function 
Justinian tried to fuse with the Roman evidentiary function when 
he enacted what is precisely the common Greek rule that on failure 
3 ibid. 18.3.6, 2; ib, 8. 
4 Codex 4.21.17.2. 
5 Jolowicz - Historical lntro<!uction to Roman Law, p. 525. 
6 Pothier - Opere Part VI ch. I, para. 498 et seq. 
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to fulfil t:he sale, t:he giver forfeits t:he acra and t:he recipient re­
stores twice t:he amount.' 
Pothier' opines that there are two types of earnest, t:hat which is 
given on conclusion of the contract of sale, and that which is 
given ac the time when a future contract is agreed to. The 'arra 
poenitencialis' is considered by him as a separate contract, with 
its particular physiognomy, which need not be stated in express 
terms, for as soon as one of the parties gives a thing to the other, 
the agreement as co earnest is concluded. This is a 'real' contract, 
because ic postulates the delivery of the thing, of which the re­
cei...,er becomes me owner, if and when the party giving it fails co 
conclude the sale. The receiver of earnest, if he resiles from the 
preliminary agreement, is bound to return double, or the thing and 
its value. In case the contract is no longer possible due to supe� 
vening causes, which are not imputable to either parry, the re­
ceiver is bound only to restore the thing. If the sale is concluded, 
the party receiving is bound to recuro the thing, but if chis is a sum 
of money, he should impute it to the price. 
Regarding earnest which is given on conclusion of the contract, 
Pothier considers that these are given on account of the price and 
should be ,imputed co it. In cases of doubt whether the earnest has 
been given as proof of conclusion of the sale or of the projected 
sale, one should look to all attendant circumstances. 
Earnest seems to be a legal multi-headed hydra, especially in 
modem legal doctrine. In Farrugia vs. Fenech7 the Commercial 
Court stated that, in legal cenninology, the word 'earnest' has dif­
ferent meanings, and distinguished the three cases of eamesc 
given in promises of sale, in concluded sales, and as instalments 
of the purchase price. Clauses in promises of sale have evolved 
which create other shades of meaning, and one may meet with such 
expressions as 'earnest/deposit'. 
In the above-quoted judgment, the Court of Appeal stated chat 
the particular character of the agreement regarding earnest often 
resolves itself in an enquiry into the intention of the contracting 
parties. The Court of Appeal also found itself in difficulties to 
define a similar agreement in 'John Grima vs A.I.C. Arthur Cucugno 
et.•• The Commercial Hall excluded the possibility of a particular 
agreement being considered as earnest, and the Court of Appeal, 
disagreeing with the first judgment stated chat 'it resembles in
7 Vol. XL, I, p. 515. 
1 
Court of Appeal: 22.3.68. 
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some features an agreement regarding earnest', The rather unde• 
fined locution of the Court of Appeal shows that this particular 
institute of law very often baffles pigeou•hole classificati9n. 
PENITENTIAL EARNEST 
There can be no doubt that our Civil Code legislates on peniten• 
tial earnest, and that the most important feature of Sr ction 1409 is 
that it gives the parties the right to resile from the agreement, 
without being bound to the specific performance of the contract or 
damages and interests, Taken in this aspect, it represents damages 
assessed in anticipation, 8.ut this subsidiary aspect should not be 
allowed to predominate over the principal feature, that is the right 
to recede, 
It, therefore, follows that the intention of the parties to grant 
each other the right to resile should be beyond doubt, If the agree­
ment on the payment of a sum of money expressly or impliedly ex­
cludes the intention of allowing either party the power to recede, 
the payment cannot be considered as earnest, Furthermore, this 
right should be given to both parties, as from the wording of the 
law it appears clear that earnest operates bilaterally. 
The question arises whether earnest should be stipulated in the 
written instrument, in promises of sale of immovables, The solu• 
tion seems to depend on whether we consider earnest as a totally 
accessory or totally independent agreement. The Civil Code9 lays 
down that such promises must be expressed on pain of nullity in a 
written instrument, and therefore if earnest is considered as a 
totally accessory agreement, it must also be expressed in writing, 
on the general principle of law 'accessorium sequitur principale'. 
In George Farrugia vs Alfred Vella10 the plea, was raised that the 
agreement about earnest was null as there was no written promise, 
and it was held that, 'a promise of this genre without a written in• 
strument is null , Whereas earnest is an accessory obligation, and 
has no life or meaning except in relation to the principal obliga­
tion, it is evident in this case - where both parties agree that 
there was no written promise - that the· stipulation regarding the 
earnest is null , . , The argument brought forward by counsel for 
defendant, that the agreement regarding earnest should be con­
sidered independent from the promise, appears to, be wholly un• 
founded,' 
9
Section 1277 (l)(a). 
1
° First Hall 21.7.67. 
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A distinction should be made in this respect. If there is no 
written promise, then there can be no principal obligation from 
which to recede, and the giving of earnest is, therefore, to no 
effect. But if there is a written promise, and earnest has been 
agreed to verbally and actually given, the same reasoning, it is 
submitted, should not apply. Earnest is a 'real contract" consisting 
in the delivery of the thing. The written instrument is not neces­
sary to cover such an agreement, and once the original obligation 
is valid, there can be no doubt that a 'real contract' regarding that 
obligation should be valid. The principle, 'accessorium sequitur 
prin·cipale', is not applicable to such a case, as the 'accessorium' 
is a real contract, while the 'principale' is a consensual contract.
The wording of Section 1409 seems to imply that the right to 
resile is invariably the consequence of the payment of any sum of 
money on the conclusion of the promise. This cannot be the rule, if 
the intention of the parties does not support it, in each particular 
case, As was stated in Alfonso Zammit vs, Antonio P. Abela11 the
intention of the parties must be examined specifically on the point 
whether the parties in tended to grant each other the right to recede. 
In John Micallef vs, Giulia Briffau the payment of a sum of money
was declared to be an incentive to conclude the contract, rather 
than subject to forfeiture or payment of double the amount, as 
would be the case under Section 1409. The examination of the in­
tention of the parties is the starting point in the enquiry of the 
juridical nature and effects of such payments. 
DEPOSITS 
This nomenclature has made its appearance recently, perhaps for 
the benefit of foreigners buying real property, who are not familiar 
with the institute of earnest. But the particular features which it 
has assumed have raised already important legal dis01ssions, in• 
cluding two rather conflicting judgments as to their trUe juridical 
nature. 
In Oietcuti vs. Thurstonu the juridical nature of these deposits
was examined in a very elaborate judgment. The facts of the case 
were as follows: the purchaser, on signing the preliminary agree .. 
ment deposited the sum of three hundred pounds with a third party, 
11 Vol. XXI, I, p. 569.
12 Vol.XL, 1, p.187.
13First Hall, 'in parte' 10.10.67. The case was ceded on the 14th March, 
1968. 
which was to be handed over to the prospective vendor, if he re­
fused to appear on the deed of sale without a reason valid accor­
ding to law. In the writ of summons the vendor asked for payment 
of the deposit, as the sale was not effected due to the unwilling­
ness of the purchaser, which deposit was qualified as being 
•earnest-money', though the nomenclature was not used in the pre­
liminary agreement. The defendant purchaser pleaded that the
'causa petendi' was erroneous as the deposit could in no way
be considered as earnest as this was a penalty clause. On the
grounds that 'earnest' or 'arra' can have more than one meaning,
the Civil Court held that the plaintiff was fully entitled to use the
term 1Kapparra' (earnest) to give a: 'nomen iuris' ·to this deposit,
which term was then to attract its particular shade during the
hearing of the case. The Court could in no way doubt that the
plaintiff was certainly referring to the 'arra poenitentialis'.
'The essential difference', Caruana Curran J. said, 'between 
•arra poenitentialis '" and a penalty clause is to be found in the
fact that in the former there is an anticipated or actual delivery of
the sum of money, while in the penalty clause there is only a
promise.' Eamest implies immediate forfeiture, while a penalty
clause postulates a future demand for the payment of the penalty.
In Dr. Remigio Zammit Pace vs. Joseph M.Galea,L.P. 14 the 
decision is diametrically opposed to Chetcuti vs. Thurston. A de­
posit of £MI260, ten per cent of the purchase price, was made on 
the signing of the preliminary agreement on account of the price, 
which amount the buyers were to forfeit in favour of the vendors in 
case they failed to appear on the deed of sale. The Court argued 
that, 'if the money was paid by way of earnest, this would have 
been expressly stated, as earnest has a bilateral effect, since ac­
cording to Section 1409 its recipient has to refund twice the 
amount •. Therefore, the plaintiff is right in asserting that this is 
only a penalty clause, and according to Section 1163 (2) bas the op­
tion to demand the execution of the contract.' 
Such deposits are made by the consent of the parties, and as 
such they are free to regulate their internal relations, within the 
limits of the law. Some deposits are specifically contracted as 
being subject to forfeioire in favour of the vendor, if the purchaser 
recedes without being legally justified. The question to be an• 
swered is whether such deposits, without any express stipulation 
14 First Hall 26.6.69. An Appeal has been lodged. 
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as to their nature, are u:> be considered as earnest-money or noc. 
'Dr. Remigio Zammit Pace vs. Joseph Galea' makes it imperative 
that there should be an express agreement about eames� and if the 
parties do not state that this is earnest money, then the rules of 
Section 1409 are not applicable. 
That the intention of the parties should be clear is not cha!· 
lenged, but that it should be expressed by a particular 'nomen iuris' 
is not required, as it is rightly stated in Chetcuti vs. Thurston,­
especially in promises of sale of immovables which require simply 
a private writing, without the attendance of any legally qualified 
pers<;'n• 
Giorgi 15 distinguished three types of area, and it is submitted 
that his classification solves the question regarding the juridical 
nature of deposits. He considers that •area' may be: 
(a) Purely confirmatory, given as a symbolic proof of the conclu•
sion of the contract (arra in signum consensus interpositi data), 
generally an object of small value; 
(b) Penally confirmatory, given as an anticipated liquidation of 
damages, and has all the characteristics of a penalty clause, with 
the difference that it consists in the actual delivery of the earnest 
money rather than in a promise of future payment; 
(c) Penitential, which gives the right to either parry to resile.
Although the distinction between the first and the other two
types is not difficult, he says, the boundary between penally con• 
firmacory earnest and penitential earnest is not easy to frace. The 
penitential eames� is given on the understanding that either party 
may resile on forfeiting the earnest-money or on paying double the 
amount. The penally confirmatory type is aguarantee of the future 
payment of damages, in case of non•fulfilment. The party, still 
faithful to the obligation, may either ask for the forced execution 
of the contract, or retain the money, or ask for double the amount, 
if he had paid i t. 16 
There is no do_ubt that Section 1409 deals "!Vith 'arra poeniten• 
tialis', as the law specifically lays down that it grants to either 
party the right to recede from the agreement. Studied in conjunction 
with Section 1407 ( 1), earnest neutralises the rights to specific 
performance or to damages and interests, and when it is given, 
these remedies are not available to either side in a bilateral pro­
mise. 
15 Giorgi - Op. cit. Vol. IV, para. 466. 
16 Giorgi - op. cit. para. 469. 
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The insistence on· the fact that penitential earnest affects bila• 
·teral promises is important. Al though our legislator has considered
the unilateral promise in Section 1407,1 7 when dealing with the 
question of earnest, it cannot be doubted that the bilateral promise
was held in view. This is supported by the consideration that our
section faithfully reproduces the French provision. 18 Furthermore,
as the right to resile is given to both contracting parties,' the
natural corollary is that the penitential earnest is possible only in
bilateral promises. This is also the conclusion reached in Zammit
Pace vs. Galea.
If earnest, in the sense just explained, is given, the non-guilty
party has no alternative. The sum given in earnest is the measure
of liability of the defaulting party, and twice the amount if he is
the recipient.
A bilateral promise, it has been argued, can be resolved into
two unilateral promises, and the obligations assumed by one party
may not have corresponding obligations. In bilateral promises, 
either party may assume additional obligations, unless they are 
prohibited by law. Much depends on the bargaining powers of the
parties, and the ability to heap duties on and to extract benefits
from the other side.
The deposits which are currently being demanded on bilateral
promises of sale of immovable property are essentially unilateral,
binding the purchaser, in favour of the vendor, without a corres•
ponding obligation on his part. The locution adopted, 'the pur­
chaser shall forfeit ••• ' clearly implies that the vendor is not as•
suming any liability, except that which the law imposes re garding
the execution of the contract, if he resiles. If one may investigate 
the intentions of the vendor in such stipulations, one has to con•
cede that the seller, who is keeping the immovables to be trans•
ferred outside the market, wants to have a guarantee that this loss
of other opportunities is not futile. These deposits are a develop­
ment of the present boom in real estate, and a product of estate
agency business. The demand for a deposit subject to forfeirure
for change of intention relieves the estate agent of troublesome
and expensive law-suits, as it binds the purchaser in stronger
bonds. 5iing the defaulting purchaser for specific performance is
not a vety attractive proposition to the agent, who prefers finan•
cial and psychological pressures, which have an immediate impact
17 cfr. Chapter One. 
18 French Civil Code Art. 1590. 
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on the will, to legal remedies, which may be elusively unpredict­
able at times. If one considers these deposits from this angle, the 
classification of Giorgi, that they fall within the class of 'arra 
confirmatoria pen ale', is very applicable, for the following reasons: 
(a) It is 'confirmatoria': The deposit is a 'real' confirmation of
the obligation of the purchaser, who in his unilateral promise binds 
himself to buy. The payment is not made so that the purchaser may 
resile, if there is a change of mind. Moreover, there is an actual 
payment. 
(b) It is 'penale': The forfeiture of the deposit may be one of the
alternative remedies open to the vendor in case the purchaser 
defaults. 
The availability of altemative remedies distinguishes the de­
posit from penitential earnest. The defaulting purchaser cannot 
force the vendor to choose, as would be the case if the deposit 
falls under Section 1409. The vendor has two alternatives: either 
to demand the execution of the contract or else to keep the depo­
sit, in which latter case he need not action, unless the deposit is 
in the hands of third parties, as was the particular circumstance of 
Clietcuti vs •. Thurston. The wording of such forfeiture clauses cer­
tainly does not bar the demand for the execution of the contract, 
especially since the deposit is usually qualified as part of the 
price. The action of the vendor would, indeed, amount to a demand 
for the remainder of the price. If the deposit were to be considered 
as penitential, it would be imputed to the price on voluntary ex• 
ecution. 
The question arises about what action is competent to the pu� 
chaser if the vendor refuses to sell. The answer is that the pu� 
chaser has no option but to demand specific perfonnance or dam• 
ages and interests, as the case may be, as provided under Section 
1407 ( 1). If specific performance is still possible, he cannot de­
mand damages and interests. If through loss of the immovable or 
alienation· to third parties such a sale is no longer possible, then 
is the assessment of damages predetermined by the amount of the 
deposit? As has already been argued, the deposit is unilaterally 
binding, and therefore it cannot serve to calculate· the damages 
caused by the party in f avour of whom it is made, but whom it in 
no way binds. The purchaser, it is contended, would only have the 
ordinary remedies, and ·has to prove the damages suffered and their 
amount. 
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PENAL TY CLAUSES 
It is not within the scope of this thesis to discuss penalty 
clauses in general, but only in so far as they affect promises of 
sale, and particularly the current clauses which are being inserted 
in preliminary agreements for the sale of immovable property, A 
penalty clause, as defined by Section 1161, is a clause by which a 
person, in order to secure the fulfilment of an obligation, binds 
himself to something in case of non•fulfilment, The function of a 
penalty clause is to fix damages for non-fulfilment by agreement, 
It is a coercive measure, to which one submits •sponte sua'. 
The sole judges of the penalty are the parties, for it represents 
the compensation for damages which the parties suffer from the 
non-fulfilment of the obligations assumed by the other party, Sec­
tion 1165 (1) expressly states that the C.ourt cannot abate or miti• 
gate the penalty, even if it is obviously excessive, as the judge 
cannot substitute his subjective discretion for the will of the 
parties, 
The most important feature of this clause is that the creditor 
cannot demand the performance of the obligation and payment of 
the penalty, unless this has been expressly stipulated for mere 
delay (Section 1163), The choice of the remedy, however, is wholly 
in the hands of the creditor, who cannot be forced to demand either 
in preference of the other, The stipulation of a penalty -together 
with specific perfonnance is not incompatible, but the same cannot 
be said regarding a penalty and damages and interests, These may 
be demanded only for what the penal ty clause does not cover, 19 
The juridical difference between this clause and earnest is to 
be found in that a penalty clause is a promise of future payment, 
while earnest consists in the effectit•e and actual delivery of v.,hat 
shall be forfeited, as was stated in Chetcuti vs. Thurston. This 
aspect of a penalty clause makes it imperative for the creditor to 
demand the penalty, while in the case of earnest, if the creditor is 
the recipient, there is no need for such a judicial demand, 
A recent practice, which resulted to the writer from an examina­
tion of preliminary agreements, tries to make the penalty exigible 
without judicial recognition. Where a penalty clause is to be stipu· 
-lated, the preliminary agreement is made by public deed, on the
belief that it would be considered as an executive title under
Section 251(b) of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure,
19 Giorgi - op. cit. para. 460. 
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which dispenses with the judicial recognition of claims which re­
sul t from a contract received by a Notary Public. Al though this 
case has not come before the Courts, it may be quite correctly 
stated that even if a penalty results from a public deed, it is still 
necessary that there should be a judgment ordering its payment. 
The penalty, is wholly different from earnest and deposits, is 
wholly dependent on the principal obligation, which is an oblig� 
tion of doing, as has been argued in Oiapter Two. Section 251 (b) 
excludes a public deed as being an executive title when the obli• 
gacion consists in the performance of an act. The distinction be­
tween personal and physical acts and other acts in general is not 
applicable to this case, as the provision clearly limits the public 
deed as an execuci ve title only to debts which are certain, liquid 
and due, when the judicial recognition of the claim may be almost 
unnecessary. The penalty only becomes cbe in default of fulfil· 
ment of the principal obligation, which consists in the performance 
of an act, and therefore, it is submitted, it must be proved that the 
principal obligation was not performed, without good grounds at 
law, even if this clause has not been expressly stated in the pre­
liminary agreement. 
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